to fulfill its verification responsibilities in a credible manner.

For the last three years we have been doing intensive verification in Iran, and even after three years I am not yet in a position to make a judgment on the peaceful nature of the (nuclear) program. We still need to assure ourselves through access to documents, individuals (and) locations that we have seen all that we ought to see and that there is nothing fishy, if you like, about the program.

The envelope has expanded dramatically and the responsibilities have become greater, ... and I have had to adjust my role. We can make the difference between war and peace.

the agency has not performed any verification activities in (North Korea), and cannot therefore provide any level of assurance about the non-diversion of nuclear material.

We need Iran to use maximum transparency because there are a lot of question marks about its program. They need to be assured that they can use nuclear power for electricity, but the international community needs to be assured that the Iran program is exclusively for peaceful purposes.

Due process, therefore, must take its course before the Secretariat (the IAEA administration) is able to submit a detailed report.