There is a lot of proof [supporting the U.S. case against Iraq] -- the proof of failure to allow inspectors in and failure to allow inspectors, once in, to conduct inspections in an unfettered manner.

I don't want to estimate. I want to have proof.

The charges are out there, and if there was misuse or distortion [of the Iraq intelligence], we need to know it.

We do, after all, have the case of A.Q. Khan, who, for 20 years, sold secrets of nuclear weapons production to countries around the world, ... It took about 18 years before we discovered it and managed to stop it.

There are many units operating right now in Baghdad and it was a case -- genuine case -- of lack of full coordination.

It's clear that we have a lot at stake in Iraq. Failure is not an option for Iraqis or for us here in Iraq.