FastSaying

Even after human beings have reached adulthood and developmental maturity, there remain hindrances in human nature that make it difficult for them to act from moral principle. One of most fundamental challenges is the fact that the developmentally mature human mind is still a finite intelligence rather than an infinite intelligence. The adult human mind is equipped only with ‘a discursive, image-dependent understanding’ (CU V 408): in order to think abstractly, we need images. The finitude of the human condition thus poses a permanent challenge to the task of grasping ideas of pure reason such as a priori moral norms or the concept of a morally perfect will.

Kant’s basic response to this challenge of human finitude is to articulate various strategies for representing moral concepts analogically and symbolically through images. As he remarks in Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, ‘for the human being the invisible needs to be represented through something visible (sensible)’ (Religion VI 192).

Robert B. Louden

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[I]t is important to underscore Kant’s basic point that the finitude of the human condition implies a life-long need for concrete moral examples and personal exemplars. With his second argument in defence of examples, we are no longer talking about a strategy of moral education that is to be applied only to children and that can be dispensed with once they reach adulthood. Adult human beings do have stronger powers of reflection and abstraction than do children. But even adults remain saddled with ‘a discursive image-dependent understanding’, and thus they will always need examples in order to make the law visible to themselves.
— Robert B. Louden
abstractionfinitudehuman-condition
Kant in fact offers four distinct arguments in defence of the necessity and importance of examples in the moral life of human beings. First, examples play a necessary role in the moral education of young people, for the immature human mind is not yet able to apply abstract moral principles effectively. Secondly, moral examples remain epistemologically necessary even for adult human beings. Human beings are saddled with a ‘discursive, image dependent understanding’, and because of this they need to represent abstract moral concepts symbolically and analogically. Thirdly, examples provide us with hope and inspiration that what morality demands is humanly feasible. And fourthly, examples give us something concrete on which we can focus our own efforts – a mark to emulate and perhaps even to surpass.
— Robert B. Louden
emulateexampleshope
In Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone he goes so far as to claim that conscientious moral judgement cannot err. The voice of conscience, which is our internal moral judge, can serve as a ‘guiding thread’ (Leitfaden) in matters of doubt.
— Jens Timmermann
consciencekantmoral-judgment
In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant makes it quite clear that sympathetic feelings are often welcome, amiable, desirable, beautiful. They can under certain conditions be good objectively, all things considered.
But they are not morally good (V 82.18–25). A happy, well-rounded character is an ideal that lies beyond the sphere of Kant’s conception of morality.
— Jens Timmermann
beautycritique-of-practical-reasonfeeling
There is something splendid about innocence; but what is bad about it, in turn, is that it cannot protect itself very well and is easily seduced. Because of this, even wisdom - which otherwise consists more in conduct than in knowledge - still needs science, not in order to learn from it but in order to provide access and durability for its precepts.
— Christine M. Korsgaard
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